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PIERCING THE DOCTRINE OF CORPORATE
HOSPITAL LIABILITY*
According to the doctrine of corporate hospital liability, hospi-
tals may be held liable for the negligent conduct of their nonem-
ployee, professionally autonomous staff physicians. This
Comment concludes that courts that have adopted this principle
have ignored basic procedural and organizational realities of
hospital and medical practice which make the imposition of cor-
porate liability unsound. The author submits that the more logi-
cal defendants are those staff physicians who are aware of the
negligent physician's incompetence and fail to take reasonable
steps to prevent the plaintifs injury.
INTRODUCTION
When a hospital patient is injured by a negligent physician,
against whom may the aggrieved plaintiff legally proceed? Cer-
tainly the derelict physician will incur personal liability.' How-
ever, suppose the physician carries little or no malpractice
insurance and it is obvious that the plaintif's verdict will exceed
the doctor's personal financial capacity? Or suppose the plaintiff
would rather not sue the individual physician or refuses to do so
because the two maintain an extraordinarily close personal or
physician-patient relationship? Has the plaintiff a viable cause of
action against the hospital? May the plaintiff bring suit against
the other hospital staff physicians 2 who were on notice of the neg-
* The author wishes to thank Corey H. Marco, M.D., J.D., for his invaluable
help.
1. Rickett v. Hayes, 256 Ark. 893, 904, 511 S.W.2d 187, 195 (1974); Valdez v.
Percy, 35 Cal. 2d 338, 342, 217 P.2d 422, 425 (1950); Jones v. Furnell, 406 S.W.2d 154,
156 (Ky. 1966); Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home, 290 A.2d 375, 380 (Me. 1972);
Hill v. Stewart, 209 So. 2d 809, 812 (Miss. 1968); Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 392,
158 S.E.2d 339, 343 (1968); Darby v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 222 Tenn. 417, 421,
436 S.W.2d 439, 441 (1969).
2. "Staff physicians" are those physicians who have been granted "staff privi-
leges" at one or more hospitals. Pursuant to staff bylaws, medical staff appoint-
ment is ordinarily granted for a period of not longer than two years. At the time of
initial appointment or reappointment, there is a delineation of clinical privileges
for each physician on the medical staff. JOINT COMMUSSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
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ligent doctor's misconduct? Can the plaintiff simply name the en-
tire medical staff as a defendant?3
This Comment examines the significance and development of
the doctrine of corporate hospital liability,4 which originated in
the landmark case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital.5 According to this doctrine, hospitals are legally ac-
countable for the negligence of their staff physicians.6 The author
concludes that the rationale advanced by courts which have ac-
cepted the Darling principle is not consonant with the realities of
hospital structure. The more logical defendants are those staff
physicians who are, through means of professional contact or
mandatory medical committee review, on notice of the negligent
physician's incompetence and who fail to take reasonable steps to
prevent the plaintiff's injury.7
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CORPORATE HosPrrAL LIABIamY DOCTRINE
Hospitals are liable for the negligent acts of their employees
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.8 Hospitals may even
be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions of
physicians who are employed by the hospital or subject to a sig-
nificant degree of hospital control.9 However, many physicians
HOspITALs, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosprrAs 83, 87 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as ACCREDITATION MANUAL].
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) is a private, non-
profit organization whose purpose is to certify the safety and quality of hospitals
in accordance with its minimum standards. Most hospitals seek accreditation with
the JCAH to become eligible to participate in Medicare and other beneficial pro-
grams.
3. In Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975),
the plaintiff named as a defendant the entire medical staff of 141 physicians for the
negligence of one derelict surgeon. The court denied the staff defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint.
4. Although cases decided upon the doctrine of corporate hospital liability
have not used this term, most commentators have attached this or a similar label
to the theory of liability espoused by Darling and its progeny. See, e.g., Copeland,
Hospital Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Members: "Am I
My Brother's Keeper?", 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 27, 32 (1978) (hospital corporate responsi-
bility doctrine); Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsi-
bilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429, 443
(1973) (corporate negligence doctrine).
5. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
6. See Moore, Medical Staff-Corporate Accountability, 43 INs. COUNSEL J.
110, 115 (1976); Zaslow, A New Reason for Liability: Hospital Medical Staff Mem-
bership, J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1977, at 20, 21 [hereinafter cited as Zaslow, A New
Reason for Liability].
7. See Zaslow, A New Reason for Liability, supra note 6, at 22.
8. Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P.2d 997 (1953) (resident); Ber-
nardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968) (nurse); Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957) (nurse); Sepaugh v. Meth-
odist Hosp., 30 Tenn. App. 25, 202 S.W.2d 985 (1946) (intern).
9. Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972) (radiol-
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operate from private, office-based; community practices and use
hospital facilities only when necessary to admit and treat their
patients. Such doctors are independent contractors' 0 and are pro-
fessionally autonomous."1 The obvious significance of this princi-
ple, in the hospital setting, is that a hospital should not be held
liable for the negligence of independent contractor physicians.' 2
This was indeed the rule in all jurisdictions until 1965 when the
Illinois Supreme Court, in the Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital opinion,'3 announced that a hospital may be
liable for the negligent conduct of a private practitioner who is a
member of the medical staff.14
ogist was employed by the hospital on a five-year contract); Seneris v. Haas, 45
Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist was "on call" at the hospital);
Kober v. Stewart, 148 Mont. 117, 417 P.2d 476 (1966) (radiologist was "on call' at the
hospital); Lundberg v. Bay View Hosp., 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963)
(pathologist was represented by the hospital as an employee).
10. Mills, Corleto in Perspective, J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1977, at 3, 3; Southwick,
Vicarious Liability of Hospitals, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 153, 166 (1960-61); Zaslow, Vica-
rious Liability of a Hospital for Tortious Acts of Its Independent Contractors De-
livering Medical Care, 49 PA. B.A.Q. 466, 469 (1978); Comment, The Hospital's
Responsibility for its Medical Staff. Prospects for Corporate Negligence in Califor-
nia, 8 PAc. L.J. 141, 143 (1977).
Such independent physicians bill their patients directly for provided medical
treatment; likewise, the hospital receives remuneration from all hospital patients
for the services it renders. Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An
Expanding Duty of Care, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 249, 249 n.1 (1974). Mere member-
ship on a hospital medical staff does not make such independent contractor physi-
cians "agents" of the hospital. See Mayers v. Litlow, 154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 417-18,
316 P.2d 351, 354 (1957); Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 fl1. App. 3d 987, 990,
284 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1972).
11. O'Sullivan & Wing, The Hospital-Based Physician: Current Status and Sig-
nificance, J. LEGAL MED., May-June, 1973, at 20, 21.
12. See Cramer v. Hoffman, 390 F.2d 19, 23 (2nd Cir. 1968); Mayers v. Litlow,
154 Cal. App. 2d 413, 418, 316 P.2d 351, 354 (1957).
13. 33 Mll. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
14. See Moore, Medical Staff-Corporate Accountability, 43 INS. COUNSEL J.
110, 114 (1976); Zaslow, A New Reason for Liability, supra note 6, at 21.
Prior to the Darling decision, an injured patient was able to sue only the indi-
vidual negligent physician. The impact of this case in the medico-legal field has
been analogized to that of the Palsgraf decision in the area of general negligence.
Springer, Medical Staff Law and the Hospital, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 952, 954
(1971).
Profuse academic comment followed the Darling decision. For a sampling of the
articles which have been written analyzing the significance of Darling and its
progeny or advocating the increased adoption of the doctrine of corporate hospital
liability, see Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical
Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?", 5 N. KY. L. REV. 27 (1978); Ludlam,
The Impact of the Darling Decision Upon the Practice of Medicine & Hospitals, 11
FORUM 756 (1975-76); Moore, Medical Staff--Corporate Accountability, 43 INS.
COUNSEL J. 110 (1976); Rapp, Darling and Its Progeny: A Radical Approach To-
Since Darling was decided, the corporate negligence doctrine
has been recognized by appellate courts in at least eight states. 5
In still other states, notwithstanding the lack of local appellate au-
thority, the Darling decision has been relied upon by trial courts
to find hospital liability.16 Because of the geographical and doctri-
nal expansion of the Darling principle, a case-by-case evaluation
of the related significant cases is warranted.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE HOsPrTAL LIABILrrY DoCTmE
In Darling, a college student broke his leg during a football
game. He was taken to the Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital emergency room where he was treated by Dr. Alexan-
der.'7 Dr. Alexander applied traction and encased the leg in a
plaster cast. The cast was improperly applied so that the circula-
tion in Mr. Darling's leg was blocked. His protruding toes became
swollen, dark, and insensitive. Dr. Alexander, in an attempt to
loosen the cast, split the sides of the cast with a saw. He negli-
gently cut the plaintiffs leg on both sides.'8 Blood and other
ward Hospital Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 883 (1972); Slawkowski, Do the Courts Under-
stand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST. Louis U.LJ. 452 (1978);
Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its
Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAi. W.L REV. 429 (1973); Note, Independ-
ent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 953
(1973); Note, Hospital Liability-A New Duty of Care, 19 ME. L. REV. 102 (1967);
Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An Expanding Duty of Care, 7
CREiGHTON L. REV. 249 (1974); Comment, The Hospital's Responsibilityfor its Med-
ical Staff. Prospects for Corporate Negligence in California, 8 PAc. LJ. 141 (1977);
Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Mal-
practice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385 (1975).
15. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Joiner v. Mitch-
ell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), affid, 229 Ga. 140, 189
S.E.2d 412 (1972); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop
Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Corleto v. Shore Me-
morial I-osp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19
N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967); Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88
Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72
Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
16. In California, for example, no appellate court has ever been asked to recog-
nize or refute the corporate negligence doctrine. However, numerous trial court
decisions have relied on it to reach liability. See, e.g., Eng v. Valley Memorial
Hosp., Civ. No. 460898-3 (Super. Ct. Alameda County, Cal. Dec. 15, 1977); Gonzales
v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27, 1973), rev'd
forfailure to grant jury trial, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd
and retransferred to Court of Appeal for disposition on the merits, 20 Cal. 3d 500,
573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978). In jurisdictions such as California, it ap-
pears that hospitals are not eager to appeal adverse trial court decisions for fear of
establishing the corporate negligence doctrine as appellate precedent.
17. Dr. Alexander was a private practitioner on back-up call for the hospital
emergency room.
18. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 IM. 2d 326, 328, 211
N.E.2d 253, 255 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
[VOL. 17: 383, 1980] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
seepage produced a nauseous stench in the room. Despite these
obvious signs of malpractice, neither Dr. Alexander nor any other
medical personnel administered further treatment to the plaintiff
for the next eleven days.19 When the plaintiff was finally trans-
ferred to another hospital, it was determined that the leg con-
tained so much dead tissue that amputation was necessary.20
From these harsh facts, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
hospital itself was liable for negligently failing to adequately su-
pervise the treatment rendered to the patient by Dr. Alexander. 2'
In effect, the court found the hospital owed an independent duty
of care directly to the plaintiff.22 From this genesis,23 the doctrine
of corporate hospital liability has been utilized and expanded to
impose other affirmative duties upon hospitals.24
For example, in Pederson v. Dumouchel,25 the plaintiff suffered
a broken jaw in an automobile accident. He was taken to St. Jo-
seph Hospital and admitted by Dr. Dumouchel, a private practi-
tioner.26 As the attending physician, Dr. Dumouchel called in a
dentist to reduce surgically plaintiff's fracture under general anes-
19. See id. at 328-29, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
20. Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
21. See id. at 328-33, 211 N.E.2d at 255-58; Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for
Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?" 5 N.
KY. L. REV. 27, 33 (1978); Moore, Medical Staff-Corporate Accountability, 43 INS.
COUNSEL J. 110, 114 (1976); O'Sullivan & Wing, The Hospital-Based Physician: Cur-
rent Status and Significance, J. LEGAL MED., Sept.-Oct., 1973, at 25, 26.
22. See Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical
Staff Members: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?", 5 N. KY. L. REV. 27, 33 (1978); Rapp,
Darling and Its Progeny: A Radical Approach Toward Hospital Liability, 60 ILL.
B.J. 883, 888 (1972); Comment, The Hospital's Responsibility for its Medical Staf.
Prospects for Corporate Negligence in California, 8 PAc. L.J. 141, 144 (1977).
23. Note that because Dr. Alexander was on call at the Charleston Community
Memorial Hospital emergency room, the court might have chosen to hold the hos-
pital vicariously liable on the grounds that Dr. Alexander was subject to a signifi-
cant degree of hospital control. See cases cited note 9 supra.
24. E.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972) (duty to
revoke hospital privileges from incompetent physicians); Joiner v. Mitchell County
Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), affd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972) (duty to use due care in selection of staff physicians); Gridley v. Johnson,
476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972) (duty to require that physicians perform proper preoper-
ative diagnostic testing to assure surgery is necessary); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson
Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970) (duty to assure that adequate
medical histories are taken for admitted patients); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72
Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967) (duty to assure the presence of a licensed physi-
cian during surgery).
25. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
26. As will be the situation with all cases discussed hereafter, the negligent
physician in Pederson was an independent contractor, not a hospital employee.
thetic. The dentist had no working knowledge of the use of gen-
eral anesthetics and, therefore, left the responsibility of
administering the anesthetic to a hospital nurse.27 The surgery
was performed without Dr. Dumouchel, or any other medical doc-
tor, present in the operating room. During recovery, plaintiff ex-
perienced convulsive seizures, apparently as a result of improper
administration of the anesthetic. The plaintiff sustained brain
damage and the hospital was named as a defendant.
The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that "it is negli-
gence as a matter of law for a hospital to permit a surgical opera-
tion upon a patient under general anesthetic without the presence
and supervision of a medical doctor in the operating room .... 28
The court's decision was supported by the fact that the hospital
had permitted the breach of one of its own rules: when a patient
requiring dental care is admitted, the attending physician "shall
perform an adequate medical examination prior to dental surgery,
and be responsible for the patient's medical care."29 In this case,
Dr. Dumouchel left the hospital prior to surgery and returned just
as the plaintiff was being transferred to another hospital. Clearly,
Dr. Dumouchel had not assumed the responsibility for the pa-
tient's medical care while in surgery.30
In Fiorentino v. Wenger,3 1 the New York Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the corporate negligence doctrine and emphasized that
the notice requirement is the key element in the imposition of
hospital liability.32 In Fiorentino, a staff physician negligently
failed to obtain the informed consent of a minor patient or his
parents prior to performing a novel and dangerous surgical proce-
dure.3 3 The issue before the court was whether the hospital had
breached any duty owed by it to the patient or his parents.34 The
court held that liability did not attach to the hospital because the
evidence did not show that the hospital knew or should have
27. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 74, 431 P.2d 973, 975 (1967).
28. Id. at 80, 431 P.2d at 978.
29. Id.
30. Id. Darling's impact on the Pederson court was twofold: first, it allowed
the court to find the hospital liable for failing to adequately supervise its staff phy-
sicians; second, it permitted the introduction of pertinent hospital bylaws and reg-
ulations to furnish the basis of the hospital's standard of care.
31. 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
32. Id. at 411, 227 N.E.2d at 297, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
33. Id. at 413, 227 N.E.2d at 298-99, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 377. That the surgical proce-
dure was novel and dangerous may be an understatement. The operation was at
best experimental, as the surgeon himself had devised this "spinal jack" opera-
tion. In fact, he was the only surgeon in the country using this technique. Of the
35 times he had previously performed it, one operation resulted in paralysis; four
others were followed by serious complications. Id. at 412, 227 N.E.2d at 298, 280
N.Y.S.2d at 376.
34. Id. at 414, 227 N.E.2d at 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
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known that the doctor had not received an informed consent.35
Notwithstanding the lack of hospital liability in Fiorentino, the
New York court's verbalization of the actual or constructive
knowledge concept was subsequently advanced by the Arizona
Court of Appeals in Purcell v. Zimbelman.3 6 Dr. Purcell was neg-
ligent in his performance of an abdominal surgical operation.37
The plaintiff named Tucson General Hospital as a defendant on
the theory that the hospital knew or should have known that Dr.
Purcell lacked the skill to perform the surgical procedure in ques-
tion.38 The plaintiff offered evidence that twice previously Dr.
Purcell had been sued successfully for malpractice in the per-
formance of the identical surgical procedure. The hospital de-
fended on the ground that the two prior malpractice cases had
been presented to the hospital's department of surgery. The hos-
pital contended that because the department of surgery was com-
prised of a group of independent staff physicians, the hospital
could not be held liable for its inaction.39 The court dismissed the
hospital's defense and stated that "[because] the department was
negligent in not taking any action against Purcell or recom-
mending to the board of trustees that action be taken, then the
hospital... [was] also... negligent."40
Thus Tucson General Hospital had an affirmative duty to ex-
amine continually medical staff privileges. A breach of this duty
occurred when the department of surgery became aware that Dr.
Purcell lacked the skill to treat the plaintiff's condition and the
department failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the plain-
tiff's injury or to report this knowledge to the hospital administra-
tion.41
35. Id. at 418, 227 N.E.2d at 301, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
36. 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
37. During the operation to remove an obstruction in plaintiff's colon, Dr. Pur-
cell found a lesion. He could not tell by sight whether the lesion was cancerous.
Rather than obtaining a frozen section with which a determination could be made,
Dr. Purcell relied on the opinion of a pathologist who said the lesion looked like
cancer. The doctor then proceeded to perform a "pull through" operation which
entailed opening the abdomen and removing a piece of the bowel. Id. at 79, 500
P.2d at 339. Expert testimony revealed that an "anterior resection" was the proce-
dure ordinarily used by surgeons and that Dr. Purcell's choice of treatment was
below the average standard of a competent bowel surgeon. As a result of the neg-
ligence, the plaintiff suffered loss of sexual function, loss of a kidney, and urinary
problems. Id. at 80, 500 P.2d at 340.
38. Id. at 80, 500 P.2d at 340.
39. Id. at 81, 500 P.2d at 341.
40. Id.
41. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-E-panding Responsibilities
389
In Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority,42 the hospital's
obligation was extended further to include a duty to assure that
only competent physicians are granted staff privileges in the first
instance. The plaintiff brought her husband, who had been com-
plaining of chest pains, to the defendant hospital's emergency
room. Dr. Gonzales examined the patient, told him his condition
was not serious, and sent him home. Less than three hours later,
the patient's chest pains worsened and he died. The plaintiff sued
Dr. Gonzales for negligent diagnosis and treatment. In addition,
the plaintiff alleged independent negligence against the hospital
for granting Dr. Gonzales staff privileges without making an in-
vestigation into his background to ascertain his competence. 43
The hospital sought to absolve itself from liability on the ground
that the screening of applicants for admission to the medical staff
was a function of the existing staff members. The Georgia Court
of Appeals held that the physicians responsible for staff selection
are agents of the' hospital and therefore the hospital is accounta-
ble for any negligence committed by them.44
In summary, the doctrine of corporate hospital liability has
evolved to impose at least three general duties on hospitals: to
supervise the medical care given to patients by staff physicians; to
suspend the privileges, temporarily or permanently, of discovered
incompetent physicians; and to use reasonable care to select only
competent staff physicians in the first instance.45
How may a hospital effectively discharge these duties? Once on
notice of the malpractice of an independent contractor physician
on its medical staff, the hospital must take affirmative action to
prevent injury to its patients. The hospital might require the sus-
pension or curtailment of the doctor's privileges to reflect more
accurately the physician's true capabilities. 46 Or the hospital
might even revoke the staff privileges of an incompetent doctor.47
Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429, 451 (1973).
The court listed suspension from the staff, remonstration, and restriction of staff
privileges as possible steps the hospital could have taken against Dr. Purcell to
preclude further patient injury.
42. 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), af'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412
(1972).
43. Id. at 2, 186 S.E.2d at 308.
44. Id.
45. See text accompanying notes 17-44 supra.
46. The governing body has the power to effect such reduction of privileges.
ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz.
App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).
Clinical privileges are hospital-specific. Each hospital must define the scope of
physician clinical privileges based on individual qualifications, medical experi-
ence, and demonstrated competence. Such delineation of privileges is subject to
annual or biennial review. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53, 84-87.
47. The governing body has the power to effect such revocation of privileges.
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Once aware, actually or constructively, of prior malpractice claims
against a physician who is applying to the hospital for staff privi-
leges for the first time, the hospital may find it necessary to deny
the application to escape later charges of negligence.48
AN UNREALISTIC STANDARD FOR HosPrrALs
What is the legal basis for holding a hospital liable for the
breach of one or more of the aforementioned independent duties?
This question is more than academic because, even with respect
to Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, there
has been much confusion among the courts as to the grounds for
hospital liability.49 As discussed, the theory of liability cannot be
respondeat superior because the doctrine of corporate hospital li-
ability applies only to independent contractor physicians.50 The
rationale advanced by courts that have invoked the doctrine is
that the hospital "delegates" to the medical staff the duty to su-
pervise the medical care given by staff physicians and the duty to
select competent staff physicians.51 The medical staff thus be-
ACCREDITATION MAxuAL, supra note 2, at 53. See Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88
Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Khan v. Suburban Commu-
nity Hosp., 45 Ohio St. 2d 39, 340 N.E.2d 398 (1976).
48. See Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307
(1971), aft'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp.
Foundation, 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (1967).
49. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided Darling in 1965. Since then, even
appellate courts in Illinois have misunderstood the legal theory imposed by the Il-
linois Supreme Court to hold the Charleston Community Memorial Hospital lia-
ble. These courts, unable to ascertain another logical legal basis for liability, have
erroneously read Darling, presuming that Dr. Alexander was a hospital employee.
E.g., Collins v. Westlake Community Hosp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 847, 851, 299 N.E.2d 326,
328 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 312 N.E.2d 614 (1974); Lundahl v. Rockford Me-
morial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 466, 235 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1968). At least one
other court has also misinterpreted Darling in this fashion. See Hull v. North Val-
ley Hosp., 159 Mont. 375, 385-86, 498 P.2d 136, 141 (1972).
However, this interpretation necessarily renders Darling inconsequential be-
cause the doctrine of respondeat superior would dictate hospital liability in such a
circumstance. Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsi-
bilityfor Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385, 414 (1975).
Most commentators agree that Dr. Alexander was not a hospital employee and
thus the doctrine of respondeat superior was not the basis for hospital liability.
See, e.g., O'Sullivan & Wing, The Hospital-Based Physician: Current Status and
Significance, J. LEGAL MED., May-June, 1973, at 20, 23; Southwick, The Hospital as
an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship with the Staff
Physician, 9 CAi.. W.L. REV. 429, 447 (1973); Zaslow, A New Reason for Liability,
supra note 6, at 21.
50. See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
51. This delegation by the governing body to the medical staff is authorized by
comes an "agent" or "arm of the hospital."52 If the staff negli-
gently performs these duties, the hospital is legally responsible.5 3
A critical examination of both the duty to supervise medical
care and the duty to select and retain only competent staff physi-
cians will illustrate that not only are hospitals not the most logical
defendants but also, in terms of public policy, hospitals are not
the most desirable defendants.
Duty to Supervise Medical Care
The governing body5 4 of a hospital has the ultimate responsibil-
ity for the quality of patient care rendered in a hospital.5 The
presumption is that "[p]resent day hospitals, as their manner of
operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities
for treatment .... Certainly, the person who avails himself of
'hospital facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to cure
him, not that its [staff physicians,] nurses or other employees will
act on their own responsibility."56 However, the board of trustees
and the administration of a hospital are composed primarily of
laymen from the community that is served by the hospital. 57 The
lay members of the governing body are medically and legally in-
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). See ACCREDITATION
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53.
This delegation creates further confusion regarding the legal basis for corporate
hospital liability. This delegation would seem to dictate, and the JCAH so ac-
knowledges, that the medical staff, not the corporate hospital, has the overall re-
sponsibility for the quality of all medical care provided to patients. Id. at 81.
52. See Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 142, 189 S.E.2d 412,
414 (1972); Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities
Change Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL W.L. REv. 429, 437 (1973)
(the medical staff is an agent of the corporate hospital); Comment, The Hospital-
Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50
WASH. L. REv. 385, 413-14 (1975) (the medical staff is an arm of the corporate hospi-
tal).
53. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 81, 500 P.2d 335, 341 (1972);
Copeland, Hospital Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Mem.
bers: "Am I My Brother's Keeper?", 5 N. Ky. L REv. 27, 39 (1978); Southwick, The
Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationship
with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429, 453 (1973); Comment, The Hospital-
Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50
WASH. L. REv. 385, 414 (1975).
54. The governing body of a hospital is ordinarily the board of trustees or
board of directors. See Moore, Medical Staff-Corporate Accountability, 43 INS.
COUNSEL J. 110, 110 (1976); Southwick, The Hospital's New Responsibility, 17
CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 146, 146 (1968).
55. See Horty & Mulholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22
ST. Louis U.L.J. 485, 490 (1978); Moore, Medical Staff-Corporate Accountability,
43 INS. COUNSEL J. 110, 114 (1976).
56. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957).
57. ACCREDrrATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 47; O'Sullivan & Wing, The Hospi.
tal-Based Physician: Current Status and Significance, J. LEGAL MED., May-June,
1973, at 20, 23; Note, Physician-Hospital Conflict: The Hospital Staff Privileges Con.
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capable of passing judgment on the quality of medical treatment
rendered by trained physicians.5 8
Because it is illogical to presume lay trustees and administra-
tors are competent to supervise the medical activities of physi-
cians,59 the overall responsibility for the quality of medical care is
delegated to the organized medical staff.60 Under Darling and its
progeny, hospitals must blindly trust their medical staffs to carry
out this delegated duty.6 1 The Darling and Pederson cases 62 are
sobering illustrations that a hospital's faith in its medical staff
may be unrewarded.
Additionally, when a hospital is held liable under the corporate
negligence doctrine, the hospital's customary remedies may be
severely limited. For example, because implied indemnity princi-
ples apply in the medical malpractice area as in traditional tort
law,63 the hospital clearly can proceed against the individual neg-
ligent doctor for indemnification subsequent to paying a judgment
entered against it. However, as a practical matter, this remedy is
of little value to a hospital in the numerous cases in which the
judgment greatly exceeds the uninsured or minimally insured
physician's personal assets.64
troversy in New York, 60 CORNELL L, REV. 1075, 1077 (1975); 8 RUT.-CAI. LJ. 177,
181 n.27 (1976).
58. Lescoe, Regulation of Health Care by Medical Staff Bylaws, J. LEGAL MED.,
Feb., 1977, at 17, 18; Rapp, Darling and Its Progeny: A Radical Approach Toward
Hospital Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 883, 885 (1972). Cf. Appleman, The Darling Case-A
"Real" Tiger?, 1975 INs. L.J. 714, 716-17 (only physicians who have spent many
years in the practice of medicine are competent to judge whether another physi-
cian has acted with due care).
59. Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility
for Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. I REV. 385, 413 (1975).
60. ACCREDrrATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 81; 8 Rur.-CAm. LJ. 177, 181 n.27
(1976).
61. See Mills, Corleto in Perspective, J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1977, at 3, 3.
In Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972), the department of
surgery was delegated the duty of supervising the surgical doctors. The staff was
negligent in not taking any action against Dr. Purcell or recommending to the
board of trustees that action be taken. Id. at 81, 500 P.2d at 341. The hospital was
held liable for the staffs breach of their delegated duty.
62. See text accompanying notes 17-30 supra.
63. See Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 228, 228
(1978). See also Greenstone, Spreading the Loss-Indemnity, Contribution, Com-
parative Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FoRum 266, 275-76 (1977-78).
64. The decision of whether or not to procure malpractice insurance is a per-
sonal one for every physician. However, hospitals in several jurisdictions now
have legislative or judicial authority to require staff physicians to maintain profes-
sional liability insurance as a condition of staff membership. E.g., Pollock v. Meth-
odist Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975); Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz.
Duty to Select and Retain Only Competent Staff Physicians
The governing body of a hospital has the authority and respon-
sibility for appointing members of the medical staff.65 Obviously,
the task of processing and evaluating the applications of physi-
cians applying to the hospital for privileges must necessarily be
delegated to the medical staff.6 6 The lay members of the board of
trustees and directors are not qualified to evaluate the credentials
of physician applicants. Accordingly, when a physician applies to
a hospital for staff privileges, the application procedure typically
involves three steps. 67 Initially, all applications are sent directly
to the hospital's credentials committee. Composed of staff physi-
cians, the committee reviews and evaluates the applicant's stand-
ing in the medical community, primarily by referring to the
completed application form and the accompanying letters of refer-
ence.68 The file then is forwarded to the staff executive committee
for further study of the applicant's medical qualifications. Once
these two committees agree that the applicant should be granted
staff privileges, their recommendation is forwarded to the hospital
governing board for final ratification.69
Because the ultimate determination of whether a physician ap-
plicant receives staff privileges rests with the board of directors or
trustees, it might reasonably be assumed that the board indepen-
dently reviews, studies, and investigates the applications for ad-
mission referred to it by the medical staff. In fact, the board
simply "rubber-stamps" the recommendations of the credentials
committee and the executive committee.7 0 Whomever the com-
403, 573 P.2d 477 (1978); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1319 (West 1979). Cf. Jones
v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977); Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S.
808 (1978) (state statute requiring professional liability insurance as a condition
for rendering medical services within the state is not violative of due process or
equal protection). But see McGuffey v. Hall, 557 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1977) (state stat-
ute requiring physicians to acquire malpractice insurance as a condition to prac-
ticing medicine within the state is unconstitutional).
65. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53; Moore, Medical Staff-Corpo-
rate Accountability, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 110, 110 (1976).
66. See ACCREDITATON MANUAL, supra note 2, at 53.
67. Note, Physician-Hospital Conflict: The Hospital Staff Privileges Contro-
versy in New York, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1975).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1077.
70. Through a 1979 confidential survey of medical staff coordinators at major
Southern California hospitals, the author has learned that the hospital board ac-
cepts and complies with the credentials and executive committees' recommenda-
tions in virtually 100% of all cases. A typical example was found in a San Diego
area hospital. In the 13 years that the medical staff coordinator had been em-
ployed by the hospital, the board had never failed to comply with committee rec-
ommendations. The board does no independent investigation. The committees
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mittees approve to the board are granted staff privileges. 71 Thus,
the responsibility for deciding who is accorded privileges actually
rests squarely upon members of the medical staff. Therefore, it is
not logical to subject the hospital to primary liability for the negli-
gent recommendations of the staff concerning initial staff appoint-
ments.
The Darling line of cases effectively requires hospitals to moni-
tor appointments to their medical staffs and, if warranted, to re-
voke or restrict privileges which previously have been granted.72
Yet under current medical practice, hospitals are not free to with-
hold or reduce staff privileges at will. 3 Procedural due process
considerations severely limit a hospital's power to unilaterally
terminate any physician's opportunity to pursue his livelihood
through the use of hospital facilities.74
For example, the California Supreme Court recently held that a
physician may not be removed from or denied reappointment to a
hospital medical staff absent the minimum requirements of proce-
dural due process. 75 In an analogous case, the New Jersey rule-
that a hospital must accord a physician a full hearing before re-
jecting his initial application for staff appointment-was con-
reject one or two applications per month and these rejected applications are not
even sent to the board for its assent.
Even more surprising is that the committees themselves do little investigation.
They rely primarily on the completed hospital application form and the accompa-
nying letters of reference. If the applicant fails to admit to prior instances of mis-
conduct or malpractice, there is a substantial chance that the committee will not
check the hospitals with whom the doctor was previously associated to determine
if the application's questions were answered honestly.
The author contends that because staff members accept the delegated duty to
screen physician applicants, they should perform the task diligently or risk per-
sonal liability.
71. See id.
72. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?,
22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 452, 460 (1978).
73. Id.
74. See Hirsh, A Fish Without Water: Hospital Admitting Privileges, CASE &
COMMENT, July-Aug., 1979, at 18, 18; Comment, Hospital Medical Staff Privileges:
Recent Developments in Procedural Due Process Requirements, 12 Wa.LIE ru
L.J. 137, 139-50 (1975-76).
For further discussion of the conditions of modern medicine which make the ef-
fect of expulsion from a hospital medical staff potentially disastrous for a physi-
cian, see Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
879 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
75. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
firmed.76 These cases signify that hospitals must be prepared for
potential litigation whenever attempts are made to terminate the
privileges of a suspected or known malpractitioner.77 Although
courts may have been unwilling to interfere with the negative de-
cisions of a hospital board during the early development of the
corporate negligence doctrine, this basic assumption is no longer
valid.78
ONE PROPOSED SOLUTION
This Comment has thus far suggested that holding a hospital li-
able for the negligent performance of one of its independent con-
tractor physicians is confusing and insensitive to the realities of
hospital structure. At least one court has placed "the responsibil-
ity for medical staff function directly on the medical staff," rather
than imposing a fictional duty of control upon the hospital.7 9 In
Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital,80 a malpractice suit was filed
against a staff physician who negligently performed abdominal
surgery on plaintiffs decedent.81 The plaintiff also named the
hospital and the entire medical staff as defendants on the ground
that they knew or should have known that the doctor was not
competent to perform such a surgical procedure. The New Jersey
court, acknowledging the doctrine of corporate hospital liability,
denied the hospital's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action. In addition, the court denied the 141-
member medical staff's motion to dismiss.82 The court held that a
cause of action may exist against an entire medical staff when any
staff physician is negligent.83
The imposition of liability upon the medical staff for the mis-
conduct of a staff member appears to be more logical than corpo-
76. Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 78, 382 A.2d 393 (1977),
modified, 79 N.J. 549, 401 A.2d 533 (1979).
77. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?,
22 ST. Lous U.L.J. 452, 464 (1978).
78. Hirsh, A Fish Without Water: Hospital Admitting Privileges, CASE & COM-
mENT, July-Aug., 1979, at 18, 18.
79. Mills, Corleto in Perspective, J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1977, at 3, 4.
80. 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975).
81. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that his decedent was subjected to malprac-
tice which led to the decedent's death. Id. at 305, 350 A.2d at 535. The court, in
deciding whether to grant or deny the defendants' motion to dismiss, assumed the
allegations of the complaint could be substantiated at a future trial. Id. at 309, 350
A.2d at 538.
82. Id. at 312, 350 A.2d at 539.
83. Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 309, 350 A.2d 534, 539
(1975); Williams, The Quandary of the Hospital Administrator in Dealing with the
Medical Malpractice Problem, 55 NEB. L. REV. 401, 416 (1976); Zaslow, A New Rea-
son For Liability, supra note 6, at 20.
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rate hospital liability.84 However, this theory also has defects.
The Corleto theory of staff responsibility overlooks the practicali-
ties of hospital organization and medical practice in much the
same manner as the Darling line of cases.85 For example, in the
Corleto hospital, it is highly unlikely that all 141 physicians knew
of, or even had heard of, one another. It is also improbable that,
as a group, these physicians were aware of the misconduct of any
given staff physician. Every physician on a medical staff cannot
be responsible for monitoring the practice of each of his col-
leagues.86
The plaintiff's attorney may have named the entire medical staff
simply as a tactic to coerce settlement.87 If this was his intention,
he succeeded. The case was settled out of court before the claim
of staff negligence was litigated on the merits.88
A BET ER SOLUTION
Those few doctors whose practices bring them into frequent
professional contact with the offending physician or the particular
doctors who serve on mandatory hospital review committees are
more likely to notice instances of negligence than are the mem-
bers of the entire medical staff. All hospitals accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals are required to
establish and maintain various committees to review specific as-
pects of the practice of medicine within the institution.8 9
84. Mills, Corleto in Perspective, J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1977, at 3, 4.
85. See Zaslow, A New Reason For Liability, supra note 6, at 22.
86. Id.
87. Horty & Mulholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 485, 500 (1978).
The author submits that this tactic of naming the entire medical staff should be
considered abuse of process. The names of individual physicians and review com-
mittee members easily can and should be acquired through fundamental attorney
investigation. See Zaslow, A New Reason For Liability, supra note 6, at 22.
88. See Horty & Muholand, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22
ST. Loins U.L.J. 485, 485-87 (1978). The procedural aspects of Corleto are instruc-
tive. Plaintiff alleged the medical staff was negligent for failing to protect the pa-
tient from a known incompetent surgeon. The medical staff moved to dismiss
urging that an unincorporated association is not amenable to suit under local stat-
ute. The effect of the court's denial of the staffs motion to dismiss was that the
case proceeded through discovery towards trial. While both parties were prepar-
ing for trial, the insurance company representing the staff physicians settled with
the plaintiff for the full amount of the policy limits. Therefore, the plaintiff discon-
tinued the suit and there was never a trial on the merits as to the liability of the
medical staff. Id. at 486-87.
89. See generally ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 87-96. Each medi-
Because actual notice should be the primary consideration in
establishing the liability of passive staff physicians,9 0 the logical
alternative to the corporate negligence doctrine would be to hold
liable those medical committee members who are responsible for
processing and assessing the credentials of hospital staff appli-
cants and those physicians who are charged with review, analysis,
and evaluation of clinical performance. 91 A doctor does not be-
come grossly incompetent overnight. Even though some major
act of malpractice finally brings him and his work into legal ques-
tion, evidence at trial typically demonstrates that there has been
a pattern of negligence developing for years.92 The committee
members who previously reviewed such acts of negligence and in-
timate co-workers who were silently aware of his carelessness
have actual knowledge sufficient to hold them judicially responsi-
ble for their inaction. In addition, this knowledge is seldom com-
municated to the governing body so as to put the hospital on
actual notice.93 Yet the doctrine of corporate hospital liability fo-
cuses liability on the hospital.94
There are two primary purposes behind imposing liability for
cal committee is organized for a definite purpose. For example, a tissue review
committee is established to review the results and complications of surgery per-
formed in the hospital. A utilization committee, among other things, serves to de-
tect abnormal patterns of medical practice and services within the hospital. These
and other committees are composed of members of the medical staff and they
meet on a regular basis to carry out their assigned functions.
90. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
91. See Horty & Mulholland, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff, 22
ST. Louis U.L.J. 485, 498 n.67 (1978); Zaslow, A New Reason For Liability, supra
note 6, at 22.
92. Williams, The Quandary of the Hospital Administrator in Dealing with the
Medical Malpractice Problem, 55 NE. L. REv. 401, 405 (1976).
93. See id. at 406.
94. Veracious judges candidly admit the corporate hospital's duty of control is
purely fictional. For example, in the tragic case of Gonzales v. Nork, Civil No.
228566 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27, 1973), rev'dforfailure to grant
jury trial, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and retransferred to
Court of Appeals for disposition on the merits, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (1978), Dr. John Nork was found to have operated needlessly and negli-
gently on more than a score of patients. Much evidence was introduced demon-
strating that many medical staff members were aware of Dr. Nork's flagrant
incompetence and failed to report known instances of gross misconduct to the hos-
pital board.
Although the court conceded that Mercy Hospital had no actual knowledge of
Dr. Nork's propensity to commit malpractice, Judge Goldberg looked to other ju-
risdictions to conclude that Mercy Hospital was liable under the doctrine of corpo-
rate hospital liability.
I accept the reasoning of the courts of Arizona, Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500
P.2d, 335, 341 (Ariz. App. 1972); Georgia, Mitchell County Hospital Author-
ity v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d, 412, 414 (Ga. 1972); Illinois, Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d, 253, 257 (Ill. 1965); Nebraska,
Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital, 173 N.W.2d, 881, 844 (Neb.
1970); New York, Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d, 296, 299 (N.Y. 1967); and
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tortious conduct: to compensate the plaintiff and to provide an in-
centive to the tortfeasor to act with due care in the future.95
When hospitals are held liable for the misconduct of independent
contractor physicians, the first aim is served; but, because only
the medical staff has the knowledge and training to recognize and
prevent the occurrence of future malpractice, subjecting hospitals
to liability appears unnecessary.9 6
The imposition of corporate liability arguably creates an incen-
tive upon hospitals to prevent the occurrence of negligence within
their walls.97 However, because the duties of selection and super-
vision are rightfully delegated to the medical staff and because
staff knowledge is rarely imparted to the hospital administration,
this prophylactic effect clearly would be greater if the appropriate
staff members were threatened with liability for their own lack of
due care.98
If the law merely holds the hospital liable for the negligence of
the staff for failing to carry out its delegated duties, there is no
more than a moral impetus on the staff members to discharge
their obligations ambitiously.
CONCLUSION
A lawyer's fiduciary duty to his client mandates that all appro-
Nevada, cf. Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d,
605, 608 (Nev. 1972)....
I have reached the conclusion that the hospital is liable with great reluc-
tance, because I am sure that the Sisters of Mercy have done everything
within their power to run a proper institution. But they, like every other
governing board, are corporately responsible for the conduct of their med-
ical staff...
As for the doctors on the Mercy staff, two thoughts keep going through
my mind. The one is from Dr. Jones: "No one told anyone anything." The
other is from Edmund Burke: "The only thing necessary for the triumph
of evil is for good men to do nothing."
Id. at 194-95.
95. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 23 (4th ed. 1971).
96. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?,
22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 452, 465 (1978).
97. Roemer, Controlling and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 284, 297 (1970); Comment, The Hospital's Responsibility for its
Medical Staff. Prospects for Corporate Negligence in California, 8 PAC. L.J. 141,
149 (1977). But see Warren, The Discipline of Physicians, J. LEGAL MED., Sept.-
Oct., 1974, at 43, 44 (even with the new interest sparked in administrators and
boards of trustees by the Darling case, hospitals are still lax with regard to super-
vision and selection of staff physicians).
98. See Williams, The Quandary of the Hospital Administrator in Dealing with
the Medical Malpractice Problem, 55 NEB. L. REV. 401, 416 (1976).
priate potential defendants be named in the complaint to ensure
that sufficient monetary recovery can be realized in the event le-
gal liability is found.99 However, the "shotgun" approach of nam-
ing the errant physician, the hospital, and the entire medical staff
should be judicially disfavored.100 Basic investigation can and
should provide a plaintiff's attorney with the names of all medical
staff and committee members who potentially were derelict in the
performance of their delegated duties of staff selection and super-
vision.101
Liability for failure to assure quality medical care should be
fixed directly on the medical staff. In the usual case, only physi-
cians have the ability and training to recognize another physi-
cian's negligence.102 However, to allow the plaintiff to name the
entire medical staff as a defendant is excessive and clearly ex-
tends beyond the reasonable expectations not only of medical
staff members, but also of injured hospital patients. The most log-
ical defendants are those physicians who are on actual notice of
the primary defendant's incompetency.103
The legal basis underlying the fictional duty of control espoused
by courts adopting the doctrine of corporate hospital liability is
unclear. These courts have ignored basic procedural and organi-
zational realities of hospital and medical practice that make the
imposition of corporate liability unsound.104 Judicial attempts to
force hospitals to respond in damages for the actions of independ-
ent contractor physicians on medical staffs will continue to create
doctrinal inconsistencies, procedural due process conflicts, and an
unrealistic depiction of physician-hospital function and interac-
tion. 05 Moreover, compelling hospitals to assume this fictional
99. Mills, Corleto in Perspective, J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1977, at 3, 3.
100. Those patients who recklessly institute a malpractice action, either with-
out probable cause or with some ulterior motive, should not be afforded the pro-
tection given by the judicial process to legitimate claims. Comment, Physician
Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and Abuse of Process as Reme-
dies for Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits, 45 U. ClaN. L. REv. 604, 622 (1976).
The impact of groundless medical malpractice claims on the courts and society is
enormous. Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack- Liability of Lawyers for Institut-
ing Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FoPtDHAm L. REV. 1003, 1016 (1977).
There are many doctors who believe that the medical malpractice insurance cri-
sis has been caused largely by overzealous and unethical attorneys who institute
meritless malpractice suits solely for their settlement value. Id. at 1004, 1006. A
recent physician survey concluded that many baseless claims are settled rather
than litigated because of the fear of purely sympathetic judgments by juries. Id.
at 1008.
101. See Zaslow, A New Reason For Liability, supra note 6, at 22.
102. Appleman, The Darling Case-A "Real" Tiger?, 1975 INs. W. 714, 716-17.
103. See Zaslow, A New Reason For Liability, supra note 6, at 22.
104. Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?,
22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 452, 465 (1978).
105. See id. at 468.
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duty of control will serve to increase the cost of health care to the
public because of higher hospital insurance costs. 0 6 Finally, al-
though it may be desirable to hold hospitals liable under the pol-
icy of maximum compensation to injured plaintiffs,lO7 common
sense, logic, and the practicalities of modern hospital operation
dictate that holding liable those physicians who have been delin-
quent in reporting known incompetent doctors is the 'best way to
encourage and assure the quality medical care to which the pub-
lic is entitled.
JAMEs B. COHOON
106. See id. The doctrine of corporate hospital liability effectively causes a hos-
pital to become an insurer of the performance of its staff physicians. Comment,
The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An Expanding Duty of Care, 7 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 249, 261 (1974).
107. Injured plaintiffs are often eager to pursue the most heavily insured de-
fendant under the "deep pocket" theory. Even when the negligent staff physician
carries normally adequate insurance coverage, the hospital's coverage is much
greater and is attractive to severely injured patients. Stanczyk, The Hospital Di-
lemma-To Staff or Not To Staff, 25 FED'N INS. COUNSEL 138, 148 (1974-75).

